1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

country, often too rainless to produce even the minimum of grazing. It lies, equal in area to the rest of 'Iraq, in the Shamiya desert south-west and west of Euphrates, in the upper Jazira, east of Tigris below Baghdad, and above it astride the Jabal Ḥamrin. These wastes belonged to the true camel-breeding Arab nomads; their inlying fringes, near to the rivers, were the home of the half-settled shepherd sections of cultivating tribes.

The inhabitants of all these regions varied widely in the nearness of their approach to urban civilization and the reach of government. Nearest came the citizens of the towns: then the settled village-dwellers, then the tribal cultivators in their clusters of dwellings, then the marshmen, the half-settled shepherds on the desert fringe, and finally the pure bedouin. These last were and are by far the least numerous element; to regard 'Iraq as largely a bedouin territory is a common error, since much of the country has always afforded the possibility of settled life, and bedouin are found only where no other form of life is possible.

Of the population of the three wilayas, no reliable estimate could be given then or later. The census in Turkish times was conducted, with feeble and venal inefficiency, only in towns and only for conscription purposes. The figures supplied by tribesmen or urban community heads varied with their fears or hopes of liability or benefit. The wilaya of Baṣra in 1900, excluding its Arabian areas, may have contained half a million souls; that of Baghdad perhaps a million and a quarter, that of Mosul less than half a million. A total of midway between two and two and a half million people may fairly be estimated.

The races of which the population consisted, and by each of which some contribution was made, were various. Arabs formed the great majority. But who were these? The folk even of earliest Arabia were of mixed physical types, and it is as idle to look for 'racial purity' in their later offshoots as in other races of the modern world. The Arabs of 'Iraq, in 1900 as today, were Arabic-speaking "Iraqis': a unified amalgam containing physical elements of every population who, from prehistory, had entered the river valleys as invaders or immigrants, and had been assimilated to form that 'Iraqi community which Arabs of Arabia had subjugated in the seventh century A.D. and, by vigour of their arms and faith, had turned into 'Arabs' like themselves. The 'Iraqi people by the end of the nineteenth century were oblivious of—would have denied—any other cultural or ethnic associations.

Within their community the shared tradition and pride of race far outweighed, in most relationships, the differences created by variety of environment, dialect, and material interest: yet these, too, could be formidable as between town and tribe, and as between

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

184 795 [578] the two main social-religious communities. Northern 'Iraq belonged generally to the Sunni element in Islam, southern to the Shi'i, while in the divided central districts the Shi'a predominated. Their relations were by tradition and conviction uncordial, and their pervasive antipathy could turn to violence. There was little social admixture between them, and the Shi'is were, by their own will, almost wholly excluded from the system of education provided by the Sunni Government—and, indeed, from that Government itself.

563 162 The mountaineers of Mosul wilaya belonged to far the largest of the 'Iraq minorities, the Kurds. These formed a substantial part—perhaps a quarter or a third—of the whole Kurdish race, which occupied a wide belt from eastern Anatolia to and across the Russian and Persian frontiers: a territory claimed by fervid Armenians as their own, and covering five wilayas of Turkey, of which Mosul was the south-eastern. The Kurds formed a clear racial and linguistic block with a strong pride in past achievement and memories of princely independence. Convinced of superiority to Turk and Arab alike, they differed markedly from the latter in character, environment, and personal habit, but closely resembled them in a social organization which represented an identical response to similar social needs. Nomadism among them, with sheep and cattle in place of camels, was confined to a few tribes; but tribal loyalties prevailed everywhere, except when village or district interests, or a mere absence of leaders, had led to detribalization. About half of the Mosul sanjaq was Kurdish country, divided into the qadhās of Dohuk, 'Amadiya, Zakho, 'Aqra, and Zibar: the whole of Sulaymaniya sanjaq: and a full two-thirds of Shahrizur.

563 795 197 Except for small sections with Shi'i or heretical leanings, the Kurds of Mosul wilaya were Sunnis of the Shafi'i or Qadiri sects. Their homogeneity in language and culture was less than complete: of the three traditional or mistily historical groups—the Badinan Kurds between the Greater Zab and the Van frontier, the Suran between the two Zabs, and the Baban from Lesser Zab to Sirwan (Diyalā)—the first differed in its Kurmanji dialect from the other two, who, in common with most of the Persian Kurds, spoke and speak the Kurdi or Kurdish which had never achieved literary status.

563 621 The tendency of the surviving Kurdish nomads to settle had long been apparent, but had still far to go; and the gradual encroachment by the hillmen on the nearest of the plains—around Arbil, and west of Kifri—was to continue, household by household, for the next half-century. By 1900 the freedom of the Kurdish valley dynasties, on any major scale, belonged to the past. Turkish Qa'immaqams and Mudirs, sometimes Kurdish by race, were

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

established at every qadhā and nahiya; and the Kurds, in turn, supplied many officials and soldiers to the Empire. The educated class, in contrast to the Arab provinces, was small; there was no Kurdish intelligentsia, save for rare individuals in exile; the educated Kurd in his home or in government service became, at this period, in culture and sentiment a Turk. Their tribal organization, on the other hand, with compact and barely accessible communities of a thousand to fifty thousand souls, was likely to conform to a government administration only if the latter were sympathetic, strong, and flexible. In fact, the tribesmen in wide areas still showed a far truer loyalty to their own leaders than to Turkish officialdom; they remained, by great majority, unassimilable and uncooperative; and the wholesale insecurity which resulted from their preferred way of life could not, it seemed, be reduced by any system of indirect rule which Turks would authorize or Kurds accept.

Sharing racial origins with these, the Yazidis resembled them in type and habit. Their main concentration was in the Jabal Sinjar, fifty miles west of Mosul, but their holiest place, Shaykh 'Adi, lay in the Mosul plain. Their numbers, never formidable, had been reduced by the active antipathy of their Kurd and Arab neighbours; it was excited by the outwardly churlish Yazidi character, still more by their non-Muslim religion of devil-propitiation—if their hotch-potch of religious tenets be rightly understood—and by their close community autocracy. Though they still refused equally subjection and assimilation, their long history of major revolt and violence was at an end. The Yazidis, alleged to be mere heretics, never formed a Millet (Milla) in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkomans, village-dwelling cultivators without tribal organization, were found in numbers in the towns of Kirkuk, Altun Kupri, Arbil, and Kifri, in the villages (Qara Tepe, Tuz Khurmatu, Daquq) along the Baghdad–Mosul trunk road, and at Tall 'Afar midway between Mosul and Sinjar. These Turkish-speaking folk, perhaps descendants of frontier-guards placed there by 'Abbasid Caliphs, were famed for no special gifts or prowess, but had long contributed a host of effendis to the bureaucracy and enriched village and countryside by their quiet industry and sound sense. Some known Baghdadi and a few provincial families were of Turkoman blood. Their future history could be foreseen as one of gradual absorption in the Arab majority. The same was true of the small community of the Shabaks on the Tigris south of Mosul; they spoke a Kurdish dialect and were thought to profess a heretical type of Shi'ism.

If these Kurd, Yazidi, and Turkoman minorities were confined almost entirely to the Mosul wilaya, the case was otherwise with

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

the Persian residents in 'Iraq. These were scarcely found north of the Jabal Ḥamrin, and in southern 'Iraq were confined to a few households. Their great concentrations were in Karbalā, Kadhimiya, Samarrā, and Najf, the four Holy Cities of the Shi'a (to which all Persians adhere), and in Baghdad. Bilingual in Persian and Arabic, and found in every class from landowner to beggar, from pious Mujtahid to huckster, the Persians were exclusively town-dwelling and formed an alien community the more unmanageable because the Shi'i devotion which had led them to 'Iraq was itself among the greatest embarrassments of a Sunni empire. With the Lurs, the Persians of the Holy Cities and Baghdad had little save official nationality in common. These hardy natives of the southern Zagros, and subjects of their hereditary Wali, were familiar in Baghdad and Baṣra as porters of heavy loads, which occupation they monopolized. They were resident also as traders and craftsmen in the middle-Tigris and Gharraf regions, known there as Fayliya Kurds; and they dominated the border towns of Mandali and Badra and the villages near by. Of all this the last half-century has changed nothing; and the same is true of the gentle, mysterious, scanty race of the Ṣubbā or Sabaeans or, as they call themselves, Mandaeans. Known to travellers mistakenly as 'Christians of John the Baptist', these folk, with their own Syriac-type language and their holy books in Mandaean tongue and script, lived as silversmiths and boat-builders in the riverain towns and villages of lower 'Iraq, wherever running water was available for their rites. Their origins and beliefs, neither Muslim nor Christian, and their distinctive ceremonies and customs had in 1900 been little studied.

The 'Iraqi Jews were in 1900 one of the chief minorities in the territory. Like the main Christian sects they formed an authorized Millet of the Empire, with autonomy in their personal and community affairs. They were grouped in larger or smaller numbers in almost every urban or greater village settlement from the Van border to the farthest south. Everywhere industrious and inoffensive, they contained also, especially in Mosul and the north, the poorest and most backward elements. Exempt from military service and with little part in public life, they practised the occupations and showed the qualities of their race and administered their schools and synagogues; and many a one could be found, in the wildest Kurdish areas, as the valuable personal agent to the Aghā, who would boast of his clever Jew. In Baghdad, with a city community of some 50,000, they almost outnumbered the Sunni Arabs and exceeded the Christian, Persian, and Turkish minorities combined. With their agents in Manchester, Bombay, and Paris they had so far the supremacy in commerce and foreign trade that Mus-

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

lims were often forced into partnership, while Christian merchants had been largely driven from the field. Western education was widespread, inspired by the excellent school of the French-Jewish progressive Alliance Israélite Universelle founded in 1864. The community, which included rich landowners and 'notables', was treated with a tolerance which excluded social equality: the abilities and wealth of the successful excited jealousy and at times a bullying avarice, but never political suspicion. The ruin of their position and happiness by political Zionism lay still half a century ahead.

The Christian communities of the three wilayas differed little from those of our own day. The more populous sects belonged to official Millets headed locally by bishop, archbishop, or patriarch. Such were the Orthodox (Gregorian) Armenians, fairly numerous in the towns but nowhere concentrated: the Assyrians or Nestorians, few in the 'Iraq of 1900 and almost confined to the 'Amadiya qadhā in the extreme north: the Monophysite Jacobites with a few houses in Mosul, and the Syrian Catholics, who are Jacobites catholicized: the Armenian Catholics: small communities of Greek Orthodox and smaller of mission-converted Protestants: and finally the numerous and important Chaldaeans, who, by origin Nestorians, had been attracted from their mountains to Mosul and its villages and catholicized to form a Uniate Church. The Christians, whose prized distinctions of creed and prelate were meaningless to Turk and Arab, enjoyed a status above Jew or Yazidi but below Muslim. Poorer than the Jews, they were less resented and like them politically negligible. The suspicion which Armenian nationalism had evoked elsewhere in Turkey, to meet brutal and bloody reprisals in the Armenian massacres, was not felt in 'Iraq. The Christians owned land, cultivated in their northern villages but not in lower 'Iraq, specialized in retail commerce, hotel-keeping, artisanship, and the legal profession, and provided a number of government functionaries. The Chaldaeans of Tall Kayf had long enjoyed a monopoly of employment on the river steamers. All the communities had their own churches, priesthoods, and usually schools, served for long years past by the missions of European churches. The educational standard was advanced by 'Iraqi standards of the time, and a beginning had been made with girls' schools. The Christians like the Jews were free from military service, and paid the exemption tax. The communities of both religions sent official members to the Administrative Councils of their district.

The Turks themselves, last of the minorities to be mentioned, were represented in 'Iraq by a few dozen senior officials, by families whose property or politics constrained them to live there, by the Turkish womenfolk of upper-class urban families, and by

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

Governor had only a general power of co-ordination and discipline. These departments, directed from Istanbul, included the administration of justice: a field in which Turkish law had by 1900 developed far beyond its Shara' origins. The composite and ill-coded civil Majalla, a mass of *ad hoc* legislation, and a body of French commercial law had been adopted. The resulting codes were not only imperfectly drafted and full of anomalies, but too often quite unsuited to 'Iraqi needs. The Courts which administered them represented a comprehensive and not ill-considered system spoiled by the delays and abuses in its practical working, by its exclusive use of a foreign language, and by the underpaying of the judges. The privileged position of foreigners, protected by their outdated and resented Capitulations, was assured by special arrangements in both civil and criminal matters.

Abundant work for the Courts was provided by the department of Land Registry, or Tapu. It had been inaugurated in 'Iraq by Midḥat Pasha as a land-settlement and stabilizing measure; but in unsurveyed agricultural lands, largely in immemorial tribal possession and far from conforming to the official view that 'unalienated State lands' were at Government's free disposal, the Tapu system could do little save create new disputes, bestow rights on parties powerless to exercise them, and destroy the best elements in the shaykh–tribesman relationship. The immense practical difficulties of land settlement in 'Iraq were unrealized, and the whole essential background of cadastral survey and social control was lacking.

In the field of medicine and quarantine the standard of Turkish doctors (rarely Turkish by race) was low, their assistants and inspectors were untrained, their equipment was inadequate. The medical services, accustomed to rely on mission hospitals and dispensaries, were scanty in the towns and non-existent outside. Educational services made a slightly better showing, though standards were everywhere below those of the foreign or foreign-inspired mission schools. Free primary schools, well organized on paper, existed at most towns, and secondary also at the larger. Industrial schools had been founded at Baghdad and Baṣra, and higher theological learning was available. The military educational system was distinct. The sons of civil notables and high officials went to Istanbul to complete their Turkish education, and a few sons of the greater shaykhs to the Tribal College. The teaching profession was ill reputed and unpopular, its methods primitive.

These do not conclude the list of the 'imperial' departments. The Public Debt administration, handling selected revenues on behalf of the European creditors of the Porte: the local offices of the Régie Co-intéressée who held the monopoly for the manufacture

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

bility, for some other power to intervene with decision; a part which, in the event, was to be that of the Army.

It may be asked, would a frankly authoritarian government—dictatorship, acknowledged oligarchy or mere Arab patriarchy—have been preferable? It would in all likelihood have been still less acceptable to its public than the pseudo-democracy actually imposed; the procedures of democracy, however ill conducted, were at least educative and might later show a narrowing gulf between form and spirit. Even a semi-nominated Chamber contained enough of intelligence, experience, and public spirit to be a valuable deliberative and critical body; politics and press at least provided an arena of action for the intelligentsia, whose suppression would be dangerous as well as improper. The only alternative to 'democracy' might well prove to be a tyranny oppressive within and, by its probable international adhesions, dangerous without. 'Iraqi political history for the ten years following its achievement of independence was to be one of the alternation in short cycles of the imposition and the relaxation of authority: the former accompanied by protests and violent intrigues against 'slavery', the latter always abused by licence turning to anarchy.

There was reference above to a ruling class. In fact, claimants to leadership were more than one, and their claims if permitted could be scarcely consistent with a democratic régime. In tribal society the position of the shaykhs, with all their intestine rivalries and schisms, was still unchallenged though no longer State-sponsored. Among the Shi'i population, and especially among the tribes of the Euphrates, the influence of the 'Ulamā was still considerable and rarely exercised in the direction favoured by Government. Officialdom, an alternative source of leadership and itself a main social element, was now broadened by full admission of the Shi'is, and its standard of education, conduct, and efficiency had risen markedly since Turkish times; but nothing in its position or allegiances could lead it to a sense of solidarity with the masses. The same is true of the non-official part of that important middle class whose upper edges touched the ministerial, the lower the proletariat class, and which included the lawyers, students, journalists, doctors, superior shop-keepers, commercial employees, higher technicians, middlemen, and ex-officers. Extending from bare literacy to some learned pretensions, the class was self-conscious as the evolved and progressive element in their country; but it was frustrated by lack of active outlets in public life and especially by failure to break into the ruling circle. From it were arising, already before 1932, the new politicians and publicists. Not without quick intelligence and shrewdness, and often effective

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

as speakers and writers, this element which aspired increasingly to the leadership of the nation contained a number of able, sincere, and progressive men; but too large a proportion showed also the defects of the 'Iraqi political character—emotional hastiness, irresponsibility, egoism—and in spite of their claim to be the 'enlightened' they seemed at present not greatly to excel the 'old school' in disinterestedness or in wisdom. The 'old school', meanwhile, the ruling and minister-providing order which held most of the power in 1932, derived from the wealthier Sunni families of the greater cities, landowning or otherwise: from the ranks of senior ex-officials, who often belonged also to these families, and from the higher ex-officers, who rarely did so: and from a small class of rich Shi'i notables. These in all formed a body of established and experienced men of the world. Devoted often to sectional interests, they were not incapable of transcending them, and while willing to accept democratic forms they were reluctant to welcome disturbing elements from outside or from below.

Such elements composed the 'Iraqi political public of 1932, or claimed to lead it. Future years must reveal how far they could be reconciled, absorbed, or proved capable of self-subordination. Meanwhile, with material enough for divided councils, intrigue and faction, and for personal interests and ambitions, there were important unifying factors also, in addition to the general bonds of common religion, culture, and citizenship. All the public alike had been subject to the mandatory régime, with its control and its well-intentioned counsels—and almost all had, to some degree, reacted against it. In the future, with the passing of the direct control which Great Britain had exercised, the services of a few British servants of the 'Iraq Government would remain to be used in whatever manner and degree 'Iraqis might approve. The help of the British Ambassador,[1] successor to the High Commissioner, was equally to be available to future 'Iraqi Prime Ministers. These were and had long been factors of stability and continuity. Another had been the monarchy itself; and there was in 1932 no expectation

[1] British Ambassadors to 'Iraq in the period 1932–51 (all of whom are mentioned in the text) were: Sir Francis Humphrys, 1932–5, having been High Commissioner since 1929: Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, 1935–8: Sir Maurice Peterson, 1938–9: Sir Basil Newton, 1939–41: Sir Kinahan Cornwallis (ex-Adviser to Interior, 1921–35), 1941–5: Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird, 1945–7: Sir Henry Mack, 1947–50: Sir John Troutbeck, 1951.

The services rendered to 'Iraq by senior members of their staffs were in some cases very appreciable, though entirely unknown to the public. Those who held the position of Counsellor—and usually acted for considerable periods as chargé d'affaires—were: G. A. D. Ogilvie-Forbes, 1932–5: C. H. Bateman, 1935–8: W. E. Houstoun-Boswall, 1938–40: A. Holman, 1940–2: G. H. Thompson, 1942–5: D. L. Busk, 1946–8: H. Trevelyan, 1948–50: H. Beeley, 1950. Oriental Secretaries of the period were V. Holt, 1932–44, S. H. Perowne, 1945–7, J. C. B. Richmond, 1948–51.

1: Longrigg G-4, 5 (ca. 1915-1940) MH1 Iraq MH1

744 The Health Department, criticized for an unprecedented malaria
361 epidemic in Baghdad in 1936, seemed to call for reform and for a
631 broader activity which should include the rural and backward
466 areas as well as the towns. The period was one of many municipal
554 improvements and considerable building and town-planning. Electric power and light, widened streets, a modern water-supply, improved conservancy, municipal gardens—these were now features of all but the humblest *baladiyas*. It was, indeed, the policy of Yasin Pasha to encourage the devolution of the local services into municipal hands, and funds were provided accordingly; later Prime Ministers followed his example. The passage into law of a Labour Code in 1936 reflected pressure on Government to insist, at least ostensibly, on something of modern standards in the treatment of industrial workers; but the Code had for the moment little practical effect. A law of 1935 prohibiting non-'Iraqis from practising certain trades seemed to threaten domiciled Indians, and was suitably amended and scarcely enforced. The 1936 law abolishing, under severe penalties, the use of Turkish titles—Pasha, Bey, and Effendi—in favour of the simple Arabic 'Sayid'—Master, or Mr.—was widely ignored among the general public and by Europeans, as indeed by Ministers themselves and by others in authority.

671 The application of the National Service Law, passed in 1934,
• 184 devolved upon the Hashimi Ministry and could not but be imper-
702 fect. Wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and the weak were exploited. Armed resistance, as has been seen, was not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual. The machinery of recruitment was inefficient, census lists inaccurate, and the resulting military forces habitually below their authorized strength.
701 Nevertheless, the 'Iraq Army, with its British Military Mission constantly in support, improved its training and equipment and its housing facilities, and was highly favoured by King Ghazi. Increasing from some 11,500 men in 1933 to double that number by the end of 1936, it was now organized in two divisions and, territorially, into four districts. Its armament and capacity were sufficient for internal purposes, its corps of officers good in the lower, indifferent or poor in the higher ranks. Unused on any operations in 1934—a unique event—the Army was busy with tribal suppression in the two years following, and was shortly to
707 emerge as the arbiter of 'Iraq's political destinies. The Royal 'Iraq Air Force grew from a few machines to three formed squadrons.
701 The small surviving force of 'Iraq Levies, some 1,500 strong, was now specialized to aerodrome-guard duties under R.A.F. Command, and the Assyrian monopoly therein had been broken by the recruitment of Kurdish and Arab companies.

121 enshrined in the Statute Books of Government. And since the taxation imposed on agricultural production is one of the most important practical conditions attaching to the utilisation of land, a study of such taxation had to enter into the inquiry. Nor could any investigation of conditions of landholding in el 'Iraq be intelligible or real which did not pay careful regard to the methods of irrigation, public and private, the prevalent forms and standards of cultivation, the distribution and remuneration of agricultural labour. It was not of course possible within the period of a few months to cover this vast field of investigation as thoroughly and completely as the occasion demanded: but owing to the widespread and generous collaboration aroused, the results provide an adequate basis for immediately useful measures.

121 185 This general study of existing conditions had to precede consideration of the three objectives originally indicated, if Government was to be sure of its ground and to be provided with a trustworthy foundation for progressively constructive reform. For settlement of rights to land pre-supposes and requires some stable bases of land law, or at least of legalised custom, on which such rights can be founded. And so far, by common admission, such bases rarely exist, nor do the discussions of previous years appear to have advanced agreement as to the remedy. Again although an efficient Land Register is indispensable in due course, both for the operation of the statutorily registered tenures, and for any orderly regulation of the enormous residue of (so-called) State Domain, yet the execution of a settlement of rights to land must precede the establishment of such a Register. For an effective Land Register is nothing but an intelligible and dependable record. Its function is simply to mirror clearly and faithfully rights to land existing at any and every moment. It is useless to devote money and effort to rectifying and burnishing the mirror, so long as it will only have an unintelligible tangle to reflect. Attention must first be directed to unravelling the tangle.

185 Further, while it is certainly true that no united effort had been made, and no connected plan pursued, by the three public services mentioned, yet it will be recognised that, as subordinate Departments of three separate Ministries, they were not in a position themselves to adopt any general scheme of reform. This is clearly the responsibility of Government as a whole. And, as will appear later, if any well-concerted and effective measures are to be undertaken, the better co-operation and co-ordination of the efforts of these services will not be enough.

423 2. The lack of a well-documented collection of information about existing conditions of land tenure throughout the country was not on consideration surprising, having regard to the vicissitudes of modern el 'Iraq's short history. There must have been an enormous amount of spade work to be done in establishing orderly government throughout the country during the last ten years: and the current needs of administration no doubt completely absorbed the time and energies of those who might otherwise have undertaken a systematic collection of trustworthy information. The collection of such information, particularly in statistical form, is apt to be a slow development in any country. It requires time, a scientific appreciation of the value of exact data, and the resources of a well-established and experienced public service. And in connection with land it requires a more comprehensive and far-sighted outlook than a number of disunited Departments can reasonably be expected to produce.

423 184 The collection of a representative volume of trustworthy information was also attended by peculiar difficulty, owing to the extreme diversity of conditions prevailing throughout the country. This diversity

2: Dowson G-5 (1929-30) 1932 MHl Iraq MHl

is partly the outcome of historic causes and has partly been generated by differing local conditions and ethnic origins. Under Ottoman administration present-day el 'Iraq comprised the three vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, each somewhat jealously watching, and watched from, the capital. This separatism was accentuated by divergent economic orientations. Mosul looked primarily northwards; Baghdad to Persia and the bordering desert; Basra to the sea. And superimposed on the traditional differences between the ancient vilayets were the more varied and more stubborn ones arising from differing natural conditions. Local social influences combined with these varying conditions to produce different practices, as well as to promote different policies, in different districts.

The general absence of reliable information was nevertheless baffling. For although principles are useful guides, and illuminating discussions can be based on generalities, which may or may not be true, a more dependable foundation is needed before measures of constructive reform can be confidently embarked upon.

8. My first care was to seek copies of all important previous papers dealing with the land problems of the country. Naturally many were unobtainable, while others were rare or fragmentary; but a number of those that remained call for gratitude and acknowledgment from a later worker in the same field. Several papers, written in the days of the early administration by experienced officers of the Indian Government, outlined measures for settlement which, if steadily applied and developed, should by now have gone far to mitigate, if not remove, the worst existing disabilities. Unfortunately, the promise of this preliminary work was interrupted and never took shape.

A fresh impetus seems to have been given to the consideration of reform by an extremely able "Note on Land and Revenue Policy" written by Mr. S. H. Longrigg, late Inspector General of Revenue, in May 1926. A series of most interesting and instructive discussions followed. But the writers commonly recognise the unavoidably academic nature of many of these discussions and the need to subject proposals to experimental trial, owing to the absence of adequate information of existing conditions. It is greatly to be regretted that such trials were not made. Measures of reform consequently continued to be confined to paper debates. This sterile result was ascribed to the lack of a formal acceptance and pronouncement by Government of its intended policy. Actually the fewer pronouncements of abstract policy that are made the better for the prospects of useful reform. The failure to do anything appears in fact to have been primarily due to the lack of a competent executive service charged with the study and conduct of such reform.

4. Even if there had been full and exact information available at the Headquarter Offices of Government, it would have been desirable that I should visit each province (Liwa) and get in touch with its conditions on the spot. The general lack of such information made it imperative to secure some expression of the great volume of local knowledge and experience of the actual operation of land tenure and its incidentals from day to day, that was dispersed throughout the country.

The procedure adopted for my inquiry while in el 'Iraq may be summarised under five heads. Firstly, I endeavoured to secure copies of all important correspondence and papers dealing with the land problems of the country as already mentioned.

Secondly, I drew up a questionnaire which was issued by the Ministry of the Interior to all provincial (liwa) authorities. This asked (i) for the

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[For information on the customs of the Muntafiq tribes in Iraq, see MI1 Kuwait, 1: Dickson, Category 116, scattered references on pp. 110, 111, 124, 147, 164-171, 179, 191, 375, 421, 443-444, 518, 543, 545-560, 607-608, and 615.]